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Let me begin by thanking Dean McKay, Michael 
Sherraden, Lissa Johnson, and all the members 
of the planning committee for organizing this 
excellent conference as well as for the invitation 
to offer a few reflections.
I’ve had the good fortune of working with 
Michael, Lissa, and many at the Brown School for 
over two decades now and am thrilled that our 
partnership opportunities have multiplied since I 
moved to St. Louis 7 years ago.
My relationship with Michael began in 1990 when, 
as an entry-level staffer on the U.S. House Select 
Committee on Hunger, I was charged by Chairman 
Tony Hall with finding new ideas to end hunger 
and poverty, not just alleviate them. My recently 
completed divinity school degree had taught me 
much about spiritual poverty, but little about 
material poverty, so I wasn’t quite sure where 
to start. I was inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
doctrine of eternal recurrence, but the only thing 
recurring at that moment was the blinking cursor on 
my blank screen.
Miraculously, two policy briefs—one written by 
the Progressive Policy Institute, the other by 
CFED—landed on my desk, both highlighting a 
recent Social Service Review article in which 
Michael Sherraden (1990) argued that assets, 
hitherto neglected in U.S. poverty programs and 
policies, were essential to ending hunger and 
poverty. Fascinated, I called Michael and invited 
him to Washington to meet the chairman and me, 
but Michael, apparently early in his career and 
lacking assets himself, said he couldn’t afford the 
trip and was waiting for someone else to foot the 
bill. I don’t know who eventually paid for his trip, 
but one day he showed up in Washington.
Michael’s seminal idea saved my job and, little 
did I know, would shape my professional life as 
well. I then spent the better part of the next 
20 years trying to make asset building for the 
poor a reality in Washington, and it is from this 
“frontline” experience that I am pleased to share 
a few insights today.1
For the sake of time, and at a great risk of 
overgeneralization, I’ve condensed those two 
decades into three observations that, in my 
experience, matter in moving an idea and evidence 
into policy. In many ways, this is a story of policy 
innovation as well, since we literally were taking 
an idea formulated in the academy—though 
commendably grounded in the reality of the lives of 
the welfare moms Michael was working with—and 
trying to give it life in DC.
* * *
Perhaps the best way to convey my three 
observations is to tell some stories. The lessons 
from those stories can be summed as (1) timing 
and framing matter; (2) evidence matters, 
however … ; and (3) policy entrepreneurs and 
policy intermediaries matter.
21. Timing and Framing Matter
Ideas have merit in and of themselves, but their 
reception depends on their relevance to a time and 
place. I recall reading that the three recipients of 
the 2011 Nobel Prize in Chemistry were initially 
ridiculed by their peers because their ideas seemed 
so outrageous when first proposed.
Our field is no different. Many of you may be 
surprised to learn that it was primarily liberal 
scholars, advocates, and policymakers who were 
largely hostile to Michael’s ideas because they 
claimed to know what the poor needed and were 
capable of—certainly not accumulating savings and 
wealth. Meanwhile, Republicans, conservatives, 
and “third way” Democrats, who were eager to 
“end welfare as we knew it,” were among the first 
to embrace the ideas. Stated simply, policymakers 
either believed families couldn’t save because 
they were poor, so why bother, or believed 
families were poor because they never had the 
opportunity to save, so let’s get started.
To illustrate, the late-1990s campaign on Capitol 
Hill to create a federally funded Individual 
Development Account (IDA) demonstration 
was passionately led by Senator Dan Coats, a 
conservative Indiana Republican. Other advocates 
for multibillion-dollar inclusive asset polices 
included Senators Jim DeMint, Joe Lieberman, 
Rick Santorum, Bill Bradley, and Jeff Sessions, as 
well as President George H.W. Bush, Secretary 
Jack Kemp, and others. 
Interestingly, that same Senator Coats today no 
longer supports the government-funded IDAs 
he once championed because the dominant 
idea among many Republicans is no longer 
ending welfare, but ending government. Today, 
Republicans have largely but not completely 
retreated from progressive, multibillion-dollar 
asset-building proposals while Democrats, eager 
to respond to growing inequality, have now 
largely embraced them.
Note that, throughout all those years, the idea 
has not changed at all. But the timing and 
framing (or context) have. A seasoned lobbyist 
once told me that the three most important 
things in politics are timing, timing, and timing. 
As the welfare reform and inequality examples 
illustrate, the good ideas that will move in the 
future will be ripe for a political moment and 
framed as a problem that Congress is already 
eager to solve. So, while we cannot all be Wayne 
Gretzky and know where the puck will be, this is 
the art at the intersection of ideas, evidence, and 
policy: anticipating a political moment and having 
your idea, framing, and evidence ready to go.
2. Evidence Matters, However …
Speaking of evidence, this brings me to my 
second observation: Evidence matters, however.…
Let me begin by conveying the rapid evolution 
of IDA policy in Congress. Thanks largely to the 
leadership of Michael and Bob Friedman of CFED—a 
true policy entrepreneur who embraced asset 
development enthusiastically and largely built 
the field from scratch—funds were raised from 
the Ford Foundation and several other national 
foundations to test IDAs in 13 sites nationwide 
through the American Dream Demonstration, or 
ADD. When Senator Coats and others heard about 
ADD, the response was not “great idea, let’s see if 
it works, and then we’ll consider a larger, federal 
demonstration.” No, it was “this idea is too good 
to limit to a small, privately funded demonstration, 
so I’m going to introduce legislation.” A few years 
later, in 1998, the $25 million per year Assets for 
Independence Act was signed into law by President 
Clinton. Evidence played virtually no role, largely 
because there wasn’t any.2
Then, in 1999, I was invited to brief Senators 
Lieberman and Santorum about the idea, and 
their response was not “great idea, let’s see how 
these two demonstration projects turn out.” 
Instead, it was “this idea is too good to limit to 
any demonstration project, so we’re going to 
introduce a $10 billion dollar tax credit to make 
IDAs reach millions nationwide.” The Savings for 
Working Families Act, less than year later, came 
within an inch of becoming law but died when 
the larger bill it was attached to fell apart.3
Again, though we now had a little, evidence 
played no role in achieving this near policy 
victory. Similarly, a few years later, the 
bipartisan, bicameral, multibillion-dollar ASPIRE 
Act,4 which would automatically create Child 
Development Accounts (CDAs) at birth for all 
children, was introduced in the House and 
Senate—the very year a privately funded CDA 
demonstration project was launched, meaning 
evidence played no role in generating this bill’s 
introduction. Members just loved the idea.
3The Clinton administration also appeared eager 
to expand asset building. In early January 1999, 
Michael relayed preliminary, nonexperimental 
evidence to the White House that low-income 
families in ADD could in fact save—the key policy 
doubt at the time—and that they were saving 
about $30 a month. The result: a nearly $400 
billion dollar retirement-focused IDA called 
Universal Savings Accounts, which President 
Clinton announced in the 1999 State of the 
Union address.5 OK, the evidence mattered, 
but the magnitude of the proposal was hardly 
commensurate with the evidence! In fact, the 
morning after the State of the Union, the White 
House called and said, “OK, Ray, we’ve teed this 
thing up for you, now you tell us how it will work.” 
They had no idea. I’m not sure we did either.
Clearly, enthusiasm for the idea overwhelmed 
any evidence, leading to the policies getting 
way ahead of the practice. (As an aside, I think 
it’s completely reversed now; the practice is 
way ahead of the policy). But evidence did, 
nonetheless, play a very constructive role: While 
it had little to do with getting IDA and CDA 
policies introduced or passed, it had a lot to do 
with getting those policies right. As opportunities 
arose to revise IDA and CDA legislation and laws 
in Congress and state legislatures, evidence from 
IDAs, CDAs, and other experiments were crucial.
But this story yields another interesting 
observation about evidence: how different 
administrations and policymakers have viewed it. I 
would describe the Clinton administration, as just 
illustrated, as “eager for evidence in support of 
ideas we love”; the George W. Bush administration 
as “ideology trumps evidence”; and the Obama 
administration as “evidence, evidence, and more 
evidence, please.” In my meetings at the Bush 
White House, it was always about the idea of 
building wealth and how that reduces dependency 
on government, fosters financial freedom, and 
leads to an ownership society.6
A few years later, my meetings at the Obama 
White House, reliably with Harvard, Chicago, 
and Princeton economics professors, made me 
grateful for my grueling degree from the Kennedy 
School. To them, ideology (or, for that matter, 
asset building) mattered little, but ideas backed 
by rigorous research mattered a lot. In fact, 
as many of you know, a team of data-obsessed 
behavioral economists was brought into the 
Obama White House to nudge us all to better 
health, wealth, and happiness.
In the end, though, saving and asset-building 
policies were going nowhere in the early years 
of the Obama administration precisely because 
the evidence suggested that low- and moderate-
income Americans can save; the imperative 
then, following the Great Recession, was to get 
precisely those families to spend. Moreover, 
families and policymakers were spooked by 
asset building for the poor given that the Great 
Recession had eviscerated $16 trillion of family 
wealth, including the wealth of the very people 
the field had aimed to serve.
But that very crisis also birthed the most 
significant, unanticipated asset-building 
institution yet created: the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, or CFPB. The field is now 
highly engaged with the CFPB on a range of asset-
building strategies, including those promoting 
financial capability, tax-time savings, and CDAs, 
and evidence is central to those efforts.
In summary, then, policy can move (or not 
move!) because of the evidence, indifferent to 
the evidence, and (in some instances) despite 
the evidence. I think our job as researchers, 
academics, policy experts, advocates, and 
others is to conduct rigorous, forward-looking 
experiments rooted in the realities of people’s 
lives—to generate the best possible evidence. It 
is a commitment, I’m sure, that runs deep in this 
room today. That evidence will then, ideally, spur 
policy development or, at least—and, critically—
get a policy right over the longer term.
3. Policy Entrepreneurs and 
Policy Intermediaries Matter
The impact of evidence on policy, then, cannot 
be understood apart from the political and 
economic moment in which that evidence is 
presented. It’s hard to know when, or how, an 
idea will have impact, or when you have an 
opportunity to “go to scale.” But many other 
things matter in moving an idea forward, in 
generating policy impact.
Many of the these are quite familiar to you: 
calls, letters, media strategies, hearings, one-
pagers, grass-roots and grass-tops organizing, 
coalition building, etc. However, the ones that 
4may be less familiar but, in my view, actually 
essential to policy success are the roles of policy 
entrepreneurs (such Bob Friedman) and policy 
intermediaries (such as New America, Brookings 
Institution, American Enterprise Institute, 
Heritage Foundation, Corporation for Enterprise 
Development, Cato Institute, the DC-based trade 
associations, and many others). Perhaps needless 
to say, the foundations and donors that support 
their work are essential as well, with the best of 
donors serving as thought partners.
These policy shops have their ear to the ground for 
opportunities; play an essential “translation” role 
between research, evidence, and policy; can write 
and place timely, high-impact op-eds; and are 
often skilled at reaching—if not being an essential 
part of—the surprisingly small policy communities 
in DC that have a disproportionate effect on the 
policymaking process. They excel at organizing 
money and people around promising ideas.
In fact, my own story illustrates an open secret: 
Many members of Congress and their staff rely on 
think tanks and intermediaries to do the thinking 
and bill writing they don’t have the time or 
expertise to do. Congress needs them. But, having 
worked in think tanks as well, let me let you in on 
a less open secret: The think tanks often need you; 
they need ideas—they need academics, researchers, 
and analysts who’ve thought long and hard about 
key issues. They need you and the ideas this Grand 
Challenges conference are meant to generate.
I understand that Washington University is 
deepening its already historical ties with the 
Brookings Institution. Whether, as outlined in 
the policy briefs, you aim to build financial 
capability, ensure healthy development for all 
youth, close the health gap, or reduce extreme 
economic inequality, Brookings and other policy 
intermediaries, and the policy entrepreneurs that 
drive them, can be critical to your success.
* * *
Let me close by looking back even further than the 
last two decades. In 2009, I had the pleasure of 
publishing a book, The Next Progressive Era, which I 
coauthored with my former New America colleague, 
Phil Longman. Our view was that the conditions 
leading up to the remarkable accomplishments of 
the Progressive Era—that 30-year period beginning 
with the depression of the early 1890s—were 
remarkably similar to our own today.
So, Phil and I wondered: If we are in fact now 
seeing a once-in-a-century convergence of political, 
economic, technological, demographic, and social 
forces, could large-scale reform be on our horizon? 
Could we achieve what they achieved, and what 
could we learn from them? Does history rhyme, as 
Mark Twain apparently once said?
It just so happens that I’ll be selling my book at 
lunch today if you’d like to know the answer!
I wish we had time to explore this, but what was 
clear was that research, experimentation, and 
evidence were central to the development and 
adoption of Progressive Era ideas—and these ideas 
led to many enduring reforms that exceeded the 
ambitions of their most visionary progenitors.
I doubt that the leaders of the Wisconsin Idea, 
including Charles van Hise and Robert La Follette, 
though they aimed to have their experiments 
inspire other states, could have imagined the 
scope of their impact on the Progressive Era, 
New Deal, and beyond. Nor could Jane Addams 
and Ellen Gates Starr, following their 1888 tour 
of settlement houses in London, have imagined 
that the Hull House they would establish in 
Chicago a year later would launch the social work 
profession in the United States, or that Addams 
would go on to win the Nobel Prize.
It’s hard to know, of course, whether the 
research, reforms, and ideas under discussion 
today will have the impact of earlier leaders and 
reformers. But I commend you all for articulating 
some of the nation’s key Grand Challenges and 
the education, research, and advocacy agendas 
that go along with them. As I mentioned earlier, 
the real art of policy impact lies in anticipating a 
political moment and having your idea, framing, 
and evidence ready to go. I believe that such 
a moment is upon us and, thanks to the Grand 
Challenges conference and similar efforts, you 
are well prepared to make a difference.
Thank you.
End Notes
1. My remarks were informed by Michael 
Sherraden’s 2000 paper, From Research to Policy: 
Lessons from Individual Development Accounts, 
later published in the Journal of Consumer 
Affairs, as well as by a 2012 paper I published 
for the Center for Social Development: From 
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Asset Building to Balance Sheets: A Reflection 
on the First and Next 20 Years of Federal Assets 
Policy (Boshara, 2012). Both papers are available 
at http://www.csd.wustl.edu.
2. Although this isn’t evidence, one of the three IDA 
programs in existence at the time was offering 
eight-to-one matches, which is unheard of now 
but nonetheless remains in law today. This is one 
example of the practice being way ahead of the 
policy. For the Assets for Independence Act of 
1998, see Pub. L. No. 105-285, 112 Stat. 2759–
2772 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2014)).
3. Savings for Working Families Act, S. 895, 106th 
Cong. (1999).
4. ASPIRE (America Saving for Personal 
Investment, Retirement, and Education) Act of 
2004, S. 2751, 108th Cong. (2004).
5. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress 
on the State of the Union, 1 Pub. Papers 62, 63 
(January 19, 1999).
6. We welcomed the ownership society idea and 
framework but worked hard to make sure it 
was ownership for those who owned little or 
nothing. Still, our embrace of that framing 
caused great consternation among our fragile 
allies on the left—consternation that we were 
somehow pawns in the political right’s effort 
to privatize Social Security and other core 
elements of the 20th century welfare stare.
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